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Disability in the Welfare State: 
An Unemployment Problem in Disguise?
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Economies with low unemployment often have high disability rates. In Norway, the 
permanent disability insurance rolls outnumber registered unemployment by four to one. 
Based on administrative register data matched with firms’ financial statements and closure 
data collected from bankruptcy proceedings, we show that a large fraction of Norwegian 
disability insurance claims can be directly attributed to job displacement and other adverse 
shocks to employment opportunities. For men, we estimate that job loss more than doubles 
the risk of entry to permanent disability and that displacements account for fully 28 percent of 
all new disability insurance claims. We conclude that unemployment and disability insurance 
are close substitutes. 
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1.  Introduction 
Economies with low unemployment rates often have high disability rates. The pattern is 
particularly striking in the North-European welfare states. According to recent OECD 
statistics, the 2007 disability rates of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the Neth-
erlands ranked among the top six out of the 28 industrialized nations for which compara-
ble statistics are available (OECD, 2009, p. 14). These five countries are also well known 
for their low unemployment rates; e.g., in 2007 their average unemployment rate was 4.5 
percent compared to 7.1 for OECD Europe as a whole (OECD, 2008, p. 335). Existing 
empirical evidence points to a certain degree of substitution between unemployment- and 
disability insurance program utilization; see Black et al. (2002), Autor and Duggan 
(2003), and Rege et al. (2009). A natural question to ask is whether low unemployment 
and high disability rates are two sides of the same coin, and whether disability pension 
sometimes is unemployment insurance in disguise.     
The question is especially pertinent to recent developments in Norway. Between 
1993 and 2006, Norway experienced a staggering rise in the fraction of the working-aged 
population who received health-related social security benefits – from 15.2 to 20.4 per-
cent (Bratsberg et al., 2010a). Over the same period, the ratio of permanently disabled to 
the number of unemployed rose from 1.2 to 4.0. This growth in disability rolls occurred 
without any parallel deterioration in health conditions. To the contrary, general health 
appears to have improved:  The proportion of the adult population reporting good or very 
good health rose from 79 percent in 1995 to 81 percent in 2005, and the share reporting   3
bad or very bad health declined from 8 to 6 percent.
1 A plausible interpretation of the di-
vergent trends in health and disability is that disability claims do not arise from health 
impairments alone, but that they arise from health impairment in combination with poor 
employment opportunities, or even from poor employment opportunities alone. In that 
case, new entries into disability may not typically be triggered by health shocks, but ra-
ther by deteriorating individual employment opportunities. This is what we refer to as 
“unemployment in disguise.” We emphasize that we use this term to denote cases where 
unemployment causes disability; we do not imply that such disability claims are neces-
sarily illegitimate in the sense that they do not entail health problems. Particular health 
problems may be disqualifying with respect to certain jobs, but not with respect to others. 
And, as pointed out by Bound and Burkhauser (1999), the loss of job-specific human cap-
ital associated with displacement might undermine future (attractive) job opportunities. 
Displacement may also reinforce pre-existing health conditions and even generate new 
ones; see, e.g., Eliason and Storrie (2009a) and Sullivan and von Wachter (2009). Our 
study is motivated by the idea that the distinction between unemployment and disability 
is blurred, and, hence, that there is scope for classifying similar work limitations differ-
ently in different social insurance environments. In fact, there are strong indications in 
prior studies from Norway that unemployment might be among the key drivers of labor 
market detachment processes leading to permanent disability; see Bratberg (1999), Dahl 
et al. (2000), Rege et al. (2009), and Bratsberg et al. (2010b). In order to devise appropri-
ate strategies for curbing the rise in disability, it is important to establish empirically the 
                                                 
1 These numbers are collected from Statistics Norway’s level of living sample surveys, and can be 
downloaded from www.norgeshelsa.no.   4
extent to which lack of employment opportunities actually is the triggering event behind 
entries into disability programs. 
The present paper provides new insights on the causal relationship between indi-
vidual employment opportunities and the risk of becoming a disability benefit claimant. 
Since the risks of disability and unemployment are likely to be highly correlated at the 
individual level, we face difficult identification problems. Our empirical strategy is to 
exploit exogenous sources of variation in individual employment opportunities, generated 
by variation in employers’ economic performance (including profitability, downsizing, 
and firm closure) and idiosyncratic fluctuations in local industry-specific labor market 
tightness, to identify the causal impacts. The empirical basis is administrative employer-
employee registers, augmented with the firms’ audited accounts and information col-
lected from bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy data make it possible to distinguish genu-
ine mass layoffs from organizational restructuring, demergers, and takeovers.  
Our empirical analysis relates closely to two recent studies using Norwegian em-
ployer-employee data, Rege et al. (2009) and Huttunen et al. (2010), and more loosely to 
a broader international literature addressing the consequences of job displacement; see, 
e.g., Hamermesh (1987), Ruhm (1991), Neal (1995), Kletzer (1998), Kuhn (2002), and 
Hallock (2009). The present paper extends the existing literature in several directions. It 
is, to our knowledge, the first study to exploit data on mass layoffs resulting from re-
corded bankruptcies in order to identify the impacts of exogenous displacement on the 
subsequent disability and non-participation propensities of affected workers. It is also the 
first study to examine the impacts of continuing firms’ economic performance (i.e., the 
rate of return on their capital). In addition, we have constructed measures of local indus-  5
try-specific labor market tightness to examine the impacts of shifts in local labor demand. 
These measures are designed to represent idiosyncratic fluctuations in labor market tight-
ness across regions and industries, such that they by construction do not pick up con-
founding regional and industry factors or aggregate time trends. The paper also addresses 
the problem that the root cause of disability enrollment may be hidden in events that took 
place many years prior to actual entry into permanent disability. We show that social se-
curity careers ending in permanent disability are often extremely long and intricate. Iden-
tification of the triggering causes therefore requires long and detailed labor market histo-
ries for the population at risk. In order to identify the impacts of, e.g., job loss on the sub-
sequent probability of becoming a disability pensioner, we either have to take into ac-
count that the outcome may materialize long after its cause, or we have to examine out-
comes that materialize closer in time to their cause, but are highly correlated to the sub-
sequent risk of permanent disability. In this paper we pursue both these strategies; the 
former by examining entry into permanent disability up to six years after displacement, 
and the latter by examining entry into temporary disability programs and withdrawal 
from the labor market. 
Our key finding is that disability and non-participation risks are indeed signifi-
cantly affected by exogenous change in employment opportunities. Some of the estimated 
effects are large from an economic viewpoint, particularly for men. Our most reliable in-
dicator for individual displacement is full-time employment in a firm which is going to 
close down due to bankruptcy during the next four years. Holding such a job raises, on 
average, the risk of entering permanent disability during the upcoming six-year period by 
2.1 percentage points for male employees and 1.3 percentage points for female employ-  6
ees, when compared to holding a job in a stable firm. Taking into account that the risk of 
job loss is present even in stable firms, we assess that displacement raises the permanent 
disability risk by as much as 2.6 percentage points (123 percent) for men and 1.6 percent-
age points (50 percent) for women, ceteris paribus. We infer that displacements alone ac-
count for fully 28 percent of all new disability benefit claims among males and for 13 
percent among females in our data. Not surprisingly, we also find strong impacts on the 
propensity for non-participation. For men, the probability of being outside the labor force 
after four years increases on average by 9.0 percentage points (124 percent) as a result of 
exogenous displacement. For women, the probability rises by 12.4 percentage points (100 
percent). Employees’ disability and non-participation propensities are also affected by 
more moderate downsizing processes and even by reductions in firm profitability without 
any downsizing. In addition, employment opportunities outside the current workplace 
play a significant role. A one standard deviation deterioration in local education/industry-
specific labor market tightness (conditional on aggregate labor market tightness) raises 
the probability of entering permanent disability by around 0.4 percentage point (14 per-
cent) for men and 0.5 percentage point (also 14 percent) for women.  
The causal relationship between employment opportunity and disability propen-
sity will to a certain extent reflect that job loss and unemployment entail adverse health 
consequences; see Kasl and Jones (2002) for a recent survey. In particular, our results 
show that for male employees displacement raises the mortality rate over a six-year pe-
riod by 34 percent. Our data therefore support recent evidence from Sweden and the 
United States showing substantial adverse effects of displacement of mortality risk (Eli-
ason and Storrie, 2009b; Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009). We furthermore find that a   7
general worsening of local industry-specific employment opportunities tends to raise 
mortality among men.  
The causal effects of displacement on disability and non-participation propensities 
presented in this paper are an order of magnitude larger than comparable effects reported 
in the Rege et al. (2009) and Huttunen et al. (2010) studies. We provide evidence that 
this disparity largely stems from differences in the operational definition of “displace-
ment.” While the findings of the prior studies are based on mass layoffs identified from 
employment registers alone (with, as noted by the authors, the risk of misclassification in 
cases of reorganizations, demergers, and takeovers), the mass layoffs exploited in this 
paper are identified on the basis of auxiliary information taken from bankruptcy proceed-
ings. This turns out to reduce the attenuation bias otherwise associated with the purely 
register-based approach. We conclude that employment opportunities have large effects 
on disability insurance utilization and that there in fact exists a considerable “grey area” 
between unemployment and disability program utilization in Norway.  
2.  Institutional background and data  
Workers in Norway are insured against loss of work capacity from health impairment. 
Social insurance is compulsory and comprises sickness absence benefits, rehabilitation 
benefits, and disability pension. During sickness absences, the benefit replacement rate is 
100 percent. Sickness absence benefits cannot be paid out for more than 12 months, how-
ever. The replacement ratio associated with subsequent rehabilitation benefits or disabil-
ity pension is typically around 66 percent. Rehabilitation benefits are temporary (nor-
mally 1-3 years), and are paid out in connection with medical and/or vocational rehabili-
tation attempts. Disability pension is in practice a permanent benefit (lasting until the   8
standard retirement age of 67), as the outflow from disability pension to self-supporting 
employment is negligible. Except for very short sickness absence spells (less than four 
days), all social insurance payments require that the health impairment is certified by a 
physician. In more serious cases, the application may also be assessed by independent 
physicians appointed by the social security administration (SSA). In any case, it must be 
certified that health impairment is the main cause for the loss of work capacity. There is 
no room for taking the individual’s general employment opportunities into account, and it 
is explicitly stated in the legislation that social or economic problems do not qualify for 
disability benefits. The economic incentives embedded in the social insurance replace-
ment ratios were stable during the time period covered by this paper, although the period 
covers some attempts at tightening gate-keeping, particularly for disability pensions; see 
Bratsberg et al. (2010a) for details.  
  The employer is responsible for covering sickness insurance payments during the 
first 16 days of the sickness absence spell. For longer spells and for permanent disability, 
the costs are covered in full by the public purse. There is no experience rating; hence 
there are limited pecuniary costs for firms associated with their employees utilizing long-
term sickness or disabled. In fact, when a firm has redundant labor, but finds it difficult to 
lay off workers due to employment protection regulations, an employee’s transition to 
long-term sickness absence or disability may be profitable for the firm.  
The data we use in this paper consist of three parts. The first part contains a de-
tailed account of individual labor market and social security event histories from 1992 to 
2007, linked with comprehensive information about each individual. The second part 
contains a description of firms in terms of their employee composition and economic per-  9
formance. Indicators for economic performance are constructed from annual audited ac-
counting data, which all limited liability firms in Norway are required to make public. 
The third part contains information about the nature of firm closures. These data are col-
lected from the Norwegian bankruptcy court system. A generic problem facing research 
based on administrative employer-employee data is to distinguish genuine mass layoffs 
from “spurious” layoffs, whereby a firm appears to downsize or close down while in real-
ity it splits into smaller entities, merges with another company, or reorganizes in other 
ways. A strategy pursued in the existing literature (Fevang and Røed, 2006; Henningsen 
and Hægeland, 2008; Rege et al., 2009) is to interpret a mass layoff as “spurious” if a rel-
atively large fraction of the workers make a transition to the same “new firm.” But this 
strategy obviously will fail to identify a spurious layoff that splits the workforce, e.g., 
when a large firm is reorganized into several smaller entities. Thresholds for the fraction 
of workers moving together also yield awkward results for smaller firms. In the present 
paper, we exploit the additional information collected from bankruptcy courts to distin-
guish explicitly between closures due to bankruptcy, closures due to voluntary liquida-
tion, and takeovers (with or without a bankruptcy).  
A particular problem arising in attempts to identify the causal effect of employ-
ment opportunities on subsequent disability insurance claims is the long and variable time 
lags that may occur between the presumed cause and its observed effect. When granting a 
new disability pension, the social security administration (SSA) determines a “disable-
ment date.” This date is meant to reflect the time at which the individual was originally 
subjected to a health-impairment responsible for the loss of at least 50 percent of work 
capacity. Since the size of the disability benefit is computed on the basis of earnings up to   10
the time of disablement, the disablement date will be important for the level of benefits; 
hence its determination is likely to involve some considerate judgment. On the basis of 
recorded disablement dates in our data, we find that the disablement on average occurs 
three years before entry into the permanent disability benefit program. The variation 
across individuals is large, however, and for 15-20 percent of claimants it takes more than 
five years from the date of disablement until entry into permanent disability. The typical 
duration from disablement to disability pension uptake also varies significantly over time, 
primarily reflecting variation in policy makers’ efforts to curb the inflow to permanent 
disability. To illustrate, in our data the average “waiting time” fell from 38 months for 
1997 entrants to 32 months for 2000 entrants, after which it again rose to 36 months for 
2003 entrants to permanent disability (we do not have comparable disablement date sta-
tistics for later entrants).  
The SSA determination of the disablement date will involve some subjective 
judgment. Many disability entrants have long histories of labor market difficulties, often 
with combinations of unemployment and health problems. In these cases, it is difficult to 
identify a particular triggering event. Figure 1 displays the employment and social secu-
rity histories – month by month – during the 12-year period prior to permanent disability 
enrollment for men and women age 30 or older who entered the program in 2005. Almost 
one quarter of this group received social security transfers such as unemployment bene-
fits as long as 12 years prior to their entry into permanent disability. Visible signs of 
health problems in the group as a whole, in form of declining employment rates and cor-
responding increases in the proportion claiming temporary health benefits, appear around 
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Figure 1. Past labor market states of 2005 permanent disability entrants. 
Note: States are not mutually exclusive, as disability and unemployment may be partial and combined with 
some employment. Populations consist of 13,194 men and 15,993 women aged 30 or above who entered 




during spells of medical or vocational rehabilitation and long-term sickness leaves.) 
Three years before entry into permanent disability, around 40 percent of the men and 50 
percent of the women claimed temporary disability benefits. These patterns show that the 
road to permanent disability can be long and winding – often involving unemployment 
spells as well as periods on temporary health benefits – and that very few cases are 
“straightforward” in the sense that there is a once-and-for-all health shock leading quick-
ly and directly to a disability pension.
2 
                                                 
2 The apparent decline in temporary disability just before entry into permanent disability displayed 
in Figure 1 mirrors the occurrence of a “benefit vacuum” period after temporary disability insurance op-
tions are exhausted, but before the application for permanent disability benefits has been approved.   12
3.  The effect of employment opportunities on entry into disability 
3.1  Methodology 
To allow for long time lags between employment opportunity shocks (the presumed 
cause) and entry into permanent disability (the possible effect), we have structured our 
dataset into three four-year time periods, starting at the end of the base years of 1993, 
1997, and 2001, respectively. We condition the analysis on workers holding a full-time 
job on January 1
st following the base year. In addition, we exclude workers with recent 
social insurance spells and drop from the samples those who received social security ben-
efits for more than six months during the prior two years. We then examine the probabil-
ity of making transitions into permanent disability as well as into states that involve a 
high risk of subsequent transition to disability, as functions of, inter alia, exogenous 
change in employment opportunities. We limit the analysis to employees in private sector 
single-plant firms with more than 10 employees and for which we have access to audited 
accounting data (which includes all limited liability firms).
3 We also limit attention to 
individuals who were between 20 and 63 years of age in the base year and who resided in 
Norway throughout the analysis period. All analyses are conducted separately for men 
and women. 
We focus on three alternative outcome measures for the individual: 
                                                 
3 A key to interpretation of our results is that workplace events can be considered exogenous with 
respect to the behavior of the individual employee. Since this assumption may be questionable for small 
workplaces, below we also present results based on samples of workers in large firms (more than 50 em-
ployees) to examine the robustness of our findings. The reason why we restrict attention to single-plant 
firms is that accounting and closure/takeover data are available at the company level. Hence, the accounting 
and closure data can be directly matched to workplace data for single-plant firms only. Finally, by focusing 
on single-plant firms we avoid complications caused by within-firm job transfers following plant closures 
(Huttunen et al., 2010).   13
Table 1. Analysis populations and the distribution of outcomes. 
  Men Women 
Base year:  1993  1997  2001  1993 1997 2001 
         
Observations 130786  189703  203781  44549  59272  70373 
Disability (temporary or permanent) 
during next 4 years (%) 
9.2  12.6 13.9 14.4 19.2 21.3 
Out of labor force 4 years later (%)  7.8  10.6  11.1  14.2  16.8  17.1 
Permanent disability within 6 years (%)  3.0  3.1  2.8  3.9  4.1  3.4 
 
1.  Whether on disability—temporary or permanent—during the four-year pe-
riod following the base year. 
2.  Whether outside the labor force four years after the base year.
4 
3.  Whether entered permanent disability within six years of the base year. 
 
Table 1 lists the size of the analysis populations and their distribution of out-
comes. Comparing the three periods, we note that the incidence of permanent disability 
rose somewhat between the first and the second period, after which it declined to a level 
below that of the first period. The incidence of temporary (and permanent) disability rose 
sharply throughout the three periods; for women it increased quite dramatically, from 
14.4 percent in the 1994-97 period to 21.3 percent in the 2002-5 period. We interpret the 
implicit shift from permanent to temporary disability in the third period as reflecting at-
tempts by the Social Security Administration of curbing inflows into permanent disability 
through more ambitious rehabilitation attempts; see Section 2. 
                                                 
4 Temporary disability is measured as having spells of medical or vocational rehabilitation or at 
least six months of long-term sickness leaves during the four-year interval. Being outside the labor force 
after four years is defined as either 1) having annual earnings or self-employment income below 144,000 
NOK (2009 currency; approx 23,000 USD) during the last calendar year, 2) receiving permanent disability 
or rehabilitation benefits in the month of December that year, or 3) receiving long-term sickness benefits in 
December and for at least six months out of four-year period ending that month.    14
In order to investigate empirically the impact of employment opportunities on the 
likelihood of becoming a disability benefit claimant, we need observed variation in em-
ployment opportunities that is exogenous with respect to each individual’s disability pro-
pensity. We have identified three potential sources of such variation. Two of these oper-
ate at the workplace level, and consist of mass layoffs and variation in firm profitability, 
respectively. The third operates primarily at the county-by-occupation level, and consists 
of fluctuations in demand for the type of labor that the worker has to offer outside the 
present employer. While a mass layoff will have a very direct effect on the displaced 
workers’ employment opportunities, we hypothesize that poor (or deteriorating) firm per-
formance may put pressure on employees to quit “voluntarily” and/or to claim disability 
benefits of some kind; see Section 2. Fluctuations in local labor demand impinge on the 
employment opportunities for anyone searching for a new job.  
In this setting, true exogeneity of workplace-specific employment opportunities 
might be questioned since the quality of a firm’s employees will affect its economic per-
formance and, hence, the likelihood of laying off workers. Moreover, firm-specific em-
ployment opportunities may correlate with other disability risk factors, related to, e.g., 
occupation and work. We address these possible problems by applying extensive controls 
for potentially confounding factors, by evaluating differences in employee composition 
between different types of firms, and through extensive robustness checks of our findings 
with respect to the composition of the analysis population. These checks include analyses 
where we focus on large firms only as reverse causality is more likely to be a concern in 
small firms.    15
For mass layoffs, we have chosen a forward-looking setup, in the sense that we 
assess the impacts of closure and downsizing events that occur over a four year period 
after the base year. This is motivated by the idea that “early leavers” may have started the 
search for a new job in response to information about an impending mass layoff, imply-
ing that workers employed at the time of displacement already are highly selected; see 
Kuhn (2002) for a discussion. The downsizing indicators are computed in a similar fash-
ion as in Rege et al. (2009, p. 764), i.e., as the percentage change in the number of full-
time equivalent workers between the start of each period and the date exactly four years 
later.
5 When a workplace is downsized by 100 percent, we have – in contrast to previous 
studies – collected direct information on the reason why this happened, i.e., whether it 
resulted from a bankruptcy, a voluntary liquidation, or a takeover. Firms’ profitability is 
measured by the annual rate of return on invested capital. We include both initial profit-
ability (in the base year) and the change in profitability over the next four years as ex-
planatory variables in our models.   
In order to extract and isolate exogenous variation in local labor market tightness, 
we start out by constructing two individual and time-specific tightness indices; one re-
flecting the probability of becoming unemployed, the other reflecting the probability of 
finding a new job given that unemployment occurs. Both indices are computed on the ba-
sis of auxiliary (logit) regression models. To be precise, let  1 it u = if person i becomes un-
employed in period t and let  1 it e =  if the unemployed person finds new work within one 
year. We then set up the following models: 
                                                 
5 Note that we do not exploit information on individual layoffs in order to avoid complications 
from selection bias in cases where some workers are retained by the firm (Henningsen and Hægeland, 
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where  it x includes a large number of individual characteristics (to be explained below) 
including type of work (educational attainment and industry) and county of residence, 
and  [ ]
1
( ) exp( ) 1 exp( ) la a a
−
=+. Based on these regressions we compute for all individu-
als and each of the three periods the predicted (linear) unemployment and reemployment 
propensity indices, 
* ˆ ˆ it t it t ux φ ϕ =+  and 
* ˆ ˆ it t it t ex ψ π =+ .
6 Now, these indices are by con-
struction functions of individual covariates and will, at face value, not be independent of 
the error term in a statistical model of individual disability or withdrawal propensity. As 
we explain below, we will deal with this endogeneity problem by controlling for  it x  in all 
analyses where 
** (,) it it ue appear as explanatory variables, in essence isolating the variation 
in labor market opportunities that arise from time-varying effects of individual character-
istics (in particular education, industry, and region). 
  Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of our analysis populations and the vari-
ables designed to represent change in individual employment opportunities. Males are 
strongly overrepresented in the dataset, reflecting our focus on full-time employees in the 
private sector. Workplace turbulence (in form of downsizing, closure, or takeover) gener-
ally increased from the first to the second period, and then declined slightly again in the 
third period. An important exception from this pattern is the bankruptcy rate, which in-
creased significantly in both periods. Another important pattern to emerge from Table 2 
                                                 
6 The two indices are designed to measure labor market tightness in the first three years of each 
four-year period. We do not include the fourth year for the reason that labor market tightness is likely to 
affect the three outcome measures with some time lag.    17
Table 2.  Employment opportunities – descriptive statistics. 
  Men Women 
Base  year:  All 1993  1997  2001 All 1993  1997  2001 
          
Observations    524270 130786 189703 203781 174194  44549  59272    70373 
Age  39.4 39.3 39.1 39.9 38.7 37.9 38.6 39.3 
E d u c a t i o n           
    Compulsory  24.3  26.8  24.8 22.2 24.4 27.9 24.9 21.7 
    Secondary  56.1  55.2  56.6 56.3 54.1 56.7 55.4 51.4 
    College/University  19.1  17.6  18.2  20.9  21.0  14.9  19.3  26.3 
Earnings in base year 
(1000 NOK, 2009-value) 
402 373 389 434 297 262 287 327 
 
          
P e r c e n t   s u b j e c t   t o           
10-20 % downsizing   9.3  6.9  10.4  9.8  9.9  8.6  10.2  10.5 
20-35  %  downsizing 8.9  5.3 10.5 9.6 10.1 7.4 11.5  10.6 
35-99%  downsizing  14.0  9.8  15.5 15.4 15.6 12.7 18.3 15.0 
Closure  w  bankruptcy  2.6 1.4 2.6 3.2 1.8 1.0 1.8 2.3 
Liquidation  5.0 4.7 5.7 4.5 5.6 5.1 6.6 5.2 
Takeover  10.0 9.3 12.7 7.9 10.9  10.6  13.5 9.0 
          
Return  on  capital  0.072 0.079 0.091 0.055 0.072 0.087 0.086 0.050 
Change return on capital  -0.008 -0.001 -0.047 0.023 -0.007 -0.012 -0.042 0.026 
          
Risk  of  unemployment 14.9 14.9 13.2 16.4 15.9 16.7 14.1 17.0 
Prob.  of  reemployment 68.8 73.8 70.8 64.5 58.1 57.0 61.8 56.2 
Note: Individual characteristics (age, education, earnings) are measured in base year, while firm downsiz-
ing and closure indicators refer to four-year period following the base year. 
 
 
is that takeovers make up a majority of the firm closures in the data. Around 18 percent 
of male and female full-time employees in our dataset work in a firm that “disappears” 
over the next four years,
7 but almost 60 percent of these jobs are subject to a firm take-
over or acquisition and are therefore less likely to entail displacement than jobs in firms 
that go bankrupt.   
For our three ultimate outcome measures, we estimate the following models:  
  ( )
** Pr( 1) ,  ijt jt it j it j it j it j yl x z u e αβ δ γ λ == + + + +  (2) 
                                                 
7 In addition, there are some jobs in our dataset that seemingly disappear because of mismatches 
between firm identifiers in the two main data sources. Specifically, 1.16 percent of males and 1.25 percent 
of females work in firms that disappear from the employer-employee data during the upcoming four years 
but do not close down according to the accounting data; and 0.98 and 1.36 percent work in firms that van-
ish from the accounting data but not from the employer-employee data. We include these jobs in our analy-
ses, but mark the observations as firm-identifier mismatches.    18
where  ijt y (j=1,2,3) are three dichotomous outcome indicators for individual i correspond-
ing to the three time periods t as defined in Table 1. The vector  it z contains all workplace-
specific covariates such as initial firm size, downsizing, closure, turnover, and profitabil-
ity.
8 As explained above, the vector of individual characteristics() it x  contains informa-
tion about the (initial) type of work and county of residence. Since we do not have direct 
information about occupation, type of work is proxied by a combination of educational 
attainment and industry (resulting in 21 different job type categories). In addition, we in-
clude information about age (44 different age classes), nationality (eight classes), work 
experience (six classes), initial log earnings and the change in log earnings from the prior 
year, initial family situation (i.e., marital status, number of children and labor market sta-
tus of the spouse; 10 categories), county of residence (19 categories), and, for old work-
ers, entitlement to early retirement programs. A complete listing of the explanatory vari-
ables ( , ) it it x z  is provided in the Appendix.  
  A key point to note is that the individual characteristics () it x  used in Equation (2) 
are exactly the same as in Equation (1) and, hence, used to compute the risk of unem-
ployment and reemployment indeces, 
*
it u  and 
*
it e . This implies that the two variables are 
perfectly collinear with  it x  in any single time period in Equation (2). Note, though, that 
coefficients of Equation (1) carry a t-subscript while those of Equation (2) do not. We 
have deliberately constructed the variables this way to ensure that it is only idiosyncratic 
change in employment opportunities over time that identify the effect on the risk of dis-
                                                 
8 For firms that close down during the period, we set the change in profitability equal to the sam-
ple mean in order to keep the observation in the analysis.   19
ability and non-participation. The key source of identification is that different industries 
were subject to different cyclical fluctuations during the three observation periods. For 
example, while employment opportunities in the manufacturing industries and in agricul-
ture declined, particularly for workers with low education, the employment opportunities 
in retail, restaurants, and tourism improved. An additional source of identification is that 
the cyclical fluctuations in labor demand vary across regions. Thus, an exclusion restric-
tion is that local business cycle fluctuations have no direct effects, but affect disability 
and labor force withdrawal only through the variation they create in individual unem-
ployment and reemployment risks.  
  Since an important aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which individual 
displacement affects the risk of subsequent disability, we place considerable emphasis on 
the effects of working in a firm that is going to close down due to bankruptcy during the 
next four years. As Table 2 showed, in any of the three four-year intervals only between 
1.0 and 3.2 percent of workers experienced a bankruptcy. This does not imply, however, 
that displacements are rare. According to Salvanes (1997), as many as 10 percent of 
Norwegian jobs are eliminated every year. We therefore expect displacement to be rela-
tively common even in stable or growing firms. Table 3 shows how the downsizing and 
closure indicators correlate with subsequent incidences of registered unemployment 
(within the corresponding four-year downsizing/closure period) in our data. With unem-
ployment incidence rates of 57 percent for men and 62 percent for women, entry into reg-
istered unemployment is indeed much higher among workers exposed to a bankruptcy-
driven closure than among other workers. It is nonetheless clear from the table that un-
employment is relatively frequent regardless of type of downsizing event. The table also   20
Table 3. Incidence of registered unemployment during four-year period and mean disability and  
participation outcomes by downsizing and closure status. Average over three sample periods. 
 Men  Women 
















































No  downsizing  (<10%)  12.4  11.3 8.5  2.6 13.1  17.6  14.0 3.4 
10-20  %  downsizing    17.9 13.1 11.3  3.4  19.1 20.1 16.9  4.0 
20-35  %  downsizing  21.9 13.7 11.6  3.3  23.7 20.5 18.1  4.3 
35-99%  downsizing    26.5 14.0 13.0  3.7  29.5 19.9 19.8  4.3 
Closure  w  bankruptcy  56.5 18.8 18.8  4.9  62.2 24.7 27.9  4.3 
Liquidation  19.6 10.5 10.4  2.6  25.3 18.5 17.6  3.5 
Takeover  20.0 11.6 10.9  2.7  21.6 19.8 16.5  4.4 
 
reveals that the prevalence of our disability and non-participation outcome measures are 
higher for workers that faced workplace restructuring than for workers in stable or grow-
ing firms, and that, at least for men, the bankruptcy category stands out with high future 
incidence rates of disability and labor force withdrawal. 
To get a rough estimate of the overall level of displacements in our own data, we 
use the unemployment frequencies reported in Table 3 as a starting point. If we assume 
that all employees in the “closure with bankruptcy” category are actually displaced, we 
can infer that 56.5 percent of displaced male workers and 62.2 percent of displaced fe-
male workers register as unemployed during the four-year period in question.
9 If we fur-
ther assume that these unemployment registration propensities also apply to workers dis-
placed from other (non-bankruptcy) firms, we can use the numbers listed in Table 3 to 
back out the total number of displaced workers in our data. Doing this exercise separately 
for men and women, we compute that 31 percent of both male and female employees in  
                                                 
9 These are probably conservative estimates, as some employees in the bankruptcy bracket may 
have shifted to other firms (without any intermediate period of registered unemployment) for reasons that 
had nothing to do with the forthcoming bankruptcy.   21
Table 4. Descriptive statistics by firm closure and downsizing status. 








Outcome  (%)      
Temporary or permanent disability  19.9 14.1 15.3 12.8 
Out of labor force  20.5 12.7 13.7  9.9 
Permanent  disability  4.8 3.3 3.7 2.8 
      
Sickness absence yr before base yr (%)  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.4 
      
Female (%)  18.9  26.8 26.5 23.9 
Age    38.1 38.8 39.6 39.3 
Education      
Compulsory  28.4 24.2 25.1 23.8 
Secondary  56.7 54.5 55.1 56.1 
College/University 14.1  20.9    19.3  19.6 
Earnings in base yr (1000 NOK, 2009)  346  379  374  378 
Plant size  61.6  109.4  146.5  110.9 
      
Number of workers (all three periods)  16,462  107,409  195,047  379,546 
 
our dataset are displaced over a four-year period.
10 Even in the no-downsizing bracket 
(<10%), we find that the four-year displacement rate is 22 percent for men and 21 percent 
for women. To the extent that we interpret the effects of working in a bankruptcy-
exposed firm – as opposed to working in a firm with no downsizing – as representing the 
causal effect of displacement, our estimates will thus clearly be subject to contamination 
bias (Heckman and Robb, 1985). We return to the issue of contamination bias in Section 
3.2 below.   
As stressed by Rege et al. (2009), the estimated impact of firm closure may be 
impacted by selection bias if workers in closing firms differ systematically from workers 
in continuing firms. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for workers in firms that 
closed down due to bankruptcy and for workers in other firms. To check for possible ini-
                                                 
10 This number is only slightly below what would be expected on the basis of the 10 percent an-
nual job elimination rate reported by Salvanes (1997), which – provided that the risk is independently dis-
tributed across individuals over time – yields a 35 percent cumulative displacement rate over a four-year 
period (1-0.9
4).   22
tial differences in the workers’ health status, we report sickness absence rates for em-
ployees in closing, downsizing, and other firms in the year prior to the base year (calcu-
lated for the populations actually used in our analysis). The table reveals that the absence 
rate was slightly higher in bankruptcy and downsizing firms than in other firms. The dif-
ference is minor, however, when compared to the large differences in subsequent out-
comes. To formally test for whether employees in closing firms had poorer health than 
employees in stable or growing firms even prior to the advent of the closing process, we 
estimate a separate model with past sickness absence as the dependent variable. The 
model is formulated exactly as the models we use for other outcome variables and in-
clude the same control variables (see Equation 2), and the dependent variable is set equal 
to unity if the employee had a long-term (at least 16 days) sickness absence spell in the 
year prior to the base year (otherwise zero).  Results (not reported in tables) show that the 
estimated average marginal effect of working in a closing (bankruptcy) firm is equal to 
0.48 percentage point for men (t-value=1.77) and 0.12 percentage point for women (t-
value=0.19). Hence, although we cannot rule out minor ex ante health differences, there 
is no statistical evidence of poorer initial health in closing firms conditional on the vari-
ables that we use to explain future outcomes. 
3.2  Results from the baseline model 
Tables 5 and 6 present our key results regarding the impacts of employment opportunity 
on subsequent disability and non-participation for men and women, respectively. For ease 
of interpretation, we report average marginal effects (multiplied by 100); i.e., the mean 
percentage point impact of the explanatory variable on each of the three outcome prob-
abilities. Average marginal effects are computed on the basis of relevant comparisons   23
only, implying that for dummy variable sets with more than two categories, each cate-
gory’s average marginal effect is calculated for observations belonging to the category in 
question and the reference category only; see Bartus (2005). A complete listing of esti-
mated coefficients (with standard errors) is provided in the Appendix.
11 
As the tables show, employment opportunities have large and statistically signifi-
cant effects on the disability and non-employment propensities. For both men and wom-
en, the probability of claiming permanent disability benefits after six years, and the like-
lihood of being out of the labor force after four years, rise significantly and monoto-
nously with the level of workplace downsizing, ceteris paribus. All three outcome pro-
pensities decline significantly with the employer‘s economic performance and, at least for 
men, with improvements in local labor market tightness as captured by the risk of unem-
ployment and re-employment variables.  
As explained above, our most reliable indicator of exogenous displacement is the 
“closure with bankruptcy during the next four years” variable. As shown in Table 5, col. 
3, such an event raises a male worker’s probability of claiming permanent disability after 
six years by 2.1 percentage points, compared to working in a stable or growing firm. Giv-
en the large and variable time lags in entry into permanent disability described in Section 
2, and since virtually all permanent disability claims are preceded by extended periods on 
                                                 
11 In order to account for any covariance between employees working at the same establishment 
(and to correct for Moulton (1986) bias), we cluster standard errors within firm-by-period cells. Were we 
instead to cluster at the establishment level (to also account for any serial correlation across periods), stan-
dard errors would be slightly larger than those reported in tables. To illustrate, the standard error of the co-
efficient of the bankruptcy variable in the male permanent disability logit equation becomes 0.06118 
(21,332 cluster units) as opposed to 0.06082 (34,620 clusters) as reported in the appendix. Note also that 
the three periods will contain multiple observations of some of the workers in our sample (the baseline 
samples consist of 524,270 observations of 347,748 males and 174,194 observations of 128,391 females). 
Using clustering to account for serially correlated errors among individuals with multiple observations rais-
es standard errors by an even smaller amount than clustering within firms.   24
Table 5. 
Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on disability and non-participation.  
Men, full-time workers. 
Average marginal effects (AME) with robust standard errors (RSE). 
 Temporary  or  perma-
nent disability 
 
Out of labor force 
 
Permanent disability 
  AME RSE AME RSE AME RSE 
        
No  downsizing  (<10%)  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
10-20  %  downsizing    0.50 0.23 1.51 0.36 0.38 0.09 
20-35  %  downsizing  1.06 0.21 1.66 0.22 0.47 0.10 
35-99%  downsizing    1.72 0.21 2.95 0.27 0.90 0.10 
Closure  with  bankruptcy  4.77 0.54 7.09 0.48 2.05 0.24 
Liquidation  0.78 0.30 3.08 0.32 0.68 0.15 
Takeover  0.03 0.20 0.37 0.26 0.06 0.09 
        
Initial rate of return on capital
#  -0.14 0.08 -0.61 0.19 -0.11 0.03 
Change in return on capital
#  -0.23 0.08 -0.42 0.15 -0.07 0.03 
        
Risk of unemployment  index
#  1.67 0.30 -0.01 0.29 0.46 0.13 
Prob of reemployment index
# -0.75 0.24 -1.56 0.21 0.06 0.09 
        
Percent with outcome=1  12.22  10.10  2.96 
#Marginal effects are calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable.  
Number of observations: 524,270. Standard errors are clustered within 34,620 firm-by-period cells. 
The following controls are included in the regressions (number of categories for categorical variables in 
parentheses): Education/industry (21), age (44), nationality (8), actual work experience (6), initial level and 
change in log earnings, family situation (10), county of residence (19), size of municipality (5), firm size 
(4), employee turnover in base year (5), time period (3), firm-identifier mismatch (3), and, for old workers, 
entitlement to early retirement programs (2). 
 
temporary disability benefits and/or by self-supported periods outside the labor force, it is 
of interest to examine the impacts on these outcomes as well. According to the estimates 
in Table 5, a bankruptcy raises a male full-time worker’s probability of claiming either 
temporary or permanent disability by 4.8 percentage points and the probability of labor 
force withdrawal (measured four years after the base year) by 7.1 percentage points. 
These large additional flows into temporary disability and non-participation show that the 
2.1 percentage points rise in permanent disability identified after six years does not cap-
ture the full effect of displacement. 
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Table 6.  
Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on disability and non-participation.  
Women, full-time workers. 
Average marginal effects (AME) with robust standard errors (RSE). 
 Temporary  or  perma-
nent disability 
 
Out of labor force 
 
Permanent disability 
  AME RSE AME RSE AME RSE 
        
No  downsizing  (<10%)  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
10-20  %  downsizing    1.17 0.38 1.56 0.37 0.19 0.17 
20-35  %  downsizing  1.08 0.37 2.09 0.37 0.41 0.18 
35-99%  downsizing    0.73 0.32 3.98 0.35 0.71 0.16 
Closure  with  bankruptcy  4.44 0.81 9.80 0.89 1.28 0.41 
Liquidation  1.61 0.50 4.61 0.55 0.81 0.24 
Takeover  1.42 0.35 0.93 0.34 0.26 0.15 
        
Initial rate of return on capital
#  -0.63 0.13 -0.49 0.14 -0.14 0.06 
Change in return on capital
#  -0.31 0.13 -0.39 0.14 -0.10 0.06 
        
Risk of unemployment  index
#  1.73 0.46 -0.24 0.42 0.29 0.20 
Prob of reemployment index
# -0.42 0.46 -2.27 0.41 -0.25 0.17 
        
Percent with outcome=1  18.81  16.23  3.77 
#Marginal effects are calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. 
Number of observations: 174,194. Standard errors are clustered within 29,700 firm-by-period cells. See 
also notes to Table 5. 
 
Table 6 demonstrates that the effects of job loss on disability and non-
participation are large for women as well, though generally smaller than those for men 
when measured relative to the average outcome within gender. For a female full-time 
worker, a bankruptcy raises the disability risk by around 1.3 percentage points. The risk 
of temporary or permanent disability rises by around 4.4 percentage points, while the 
probability of non-participation goes up by 9.8 percentage points. 
The estimates listed in Tables 5 and 6 show the effect of, e.g., working in a bank-
ruptcy firm as opposed to a stable or growing firm, and not the effect of displacement per 
se. We can nevertheless use the estimated effects to evaluate the underlying causal im-
pacts of displacement. As we argued in Section 3.1, displacement is relatively common 
even in stable and moderately downsizing firms. This implies that the estimated effects of   26
closure with bankruptcy reported in Tables 5 and 6 in fact underrate the causal effects of 
displacement. Adjusting the point estimates for contamination bias caused by inclusion of 
treated (i.e., displaced) employees in the non-treatment (no downsizing) group, we find 
that displacement on average raises the permanent disability propensity for men by 2.6 
percentage points (123 percent) and for women by 1.6 percentage points (50 percent).
12 
Likewise, the risk of temporary or permanent disability rises by 6.1 percentage points (60 
percent) for men and by 5.7 percentage points (33 percent) for women following job loss. 
Finally, accounting for contamination bias, displacement raises the non-participation pro-
pensity by 9.0 percentage points (124 percent) for men and by 12.4 percentage points 
(100 percent) for women. If we assume that these effects are representative for all dis-
placed workers in our dataset, we infer that displacements account for fully 28 percent of 
all new permanent disability benefit claims among males and for 13 percent among fe-
males.
13 Similarly, we find that for men (women), displacements account for 28 (24) per-
cent of transitions to non-employment and for 16 (9) percent of transitions to temporary 
or permanent disability.  
Local industry-specific labor market conditions significantly affect transitions into 
disability and non-participation (conditional on aggregate labor market conditions). For 
example, a one standard deviation increase in the risk of unemployment (around 10 per-
                                                 
12 We adjust for contamination bias by dividing the estimated average marginal effect of “closure 
with bankruptcy” with the estimated fraction of non-displaced workers in non-downsizing firms. To illus-
trate, for men the adjusted effect is calculated as 2.05/(1-0.22) = 2.63, where 0.22 is the estimated fraction 
of displacement over the four-year interval among males in non-downsizing firms; see Section 3.1. We 
compute the counterfactual disability entry rate – the rate that would have prevailed in the absence of any 
displacements – as the actual entry rate minus the product of the estimated average effect of displacement 
and the computed overall rate of displacements. 
13 The assumption that closure-generated layoffs have the same impact as other layoffs is of course 
questionable. For example, congestion effects in local labor markets may imply that mass layoffs have lar-
ger adverse consequences than other layoffs. On the other hand, more selective layoffs may carry a stigma 
and thus serve as an adverse signal about an employee’s productivity; see Gibbons and Katz (1991).   27
centage points) raises the likelihood of entry into temporary or permanent disability by 
1.7 percentage points for both men and women. A negative shock to the local labor mar-
ket resulting in higher unemployment risk and reduced likelihood of reemployment (both 
of a magnitude of one standard deviation), is predicted to raise the inflow rate to perma-
nent disability by 0.4 percentage point (i.e., 14 percent) for men and 0.5 percentage point 
(also 14 percent) for women. While the risk of unemployment incidence has a relatively 
large effect on disability entry, labor force withdrawal is more strongly affected by the 
probability of reemployment. 
The economic performance of surviving firms – as measured by the annual return 
on their capital base – also has statistically significant effects on transitions into disability 
and non-participation (conditional on the level of downsizing). Although the effects on 
disability claims are moderate in size, they are far from negligible. For example, a one-
standard-deviation deterioration in initial profitability and its four-year change will raise 
the female entry rate into temporary or permanent disability by approximately 1 percent-
age point (0.63+0.31). The indication is that poor economic performance puts pressures 
on employees that, in turn, either trigger health problems or make it more difficult to 
maintain employment with a given health problem; see also Rege et al. (2009). 
It is probable that the impact of employment opportunity varies across workers and 
over time, and also that there is an interaction effect between displacement/downsizing 
and local industry-specific labor market tightness. To examine these possibilities, we 
have estimated models that allow for heterogeneity in the effects of interest. Although not 
reported in tables, we find evidence that the adverse impacts of displacement are larger 
for old (above 50) than for young workers. While this is true for both disability and non-  28
participation outcomes for men, it applies to the non-participation outcome only for 
women. We do not uncover statistical evidence showing that the impact of displacement 
has increased over time, although point estimates indicate a slight positive trend in the 
effect of displacement on disability propensity for women, with the female displacement 
effect becoming more similar to that of men. Not surprisingly, the effect of displacement 
on non-participation declines with the probability of reemployment. However, we do not 
find any corresponding interaction effect on the risk of entering disability. 
3.3  Robustness analyses 
Even though the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 account for a rich set of control vari-
ables, we cannot a priori rule out that employees in downsizing and closing firms differ 
systematically from employees in stable or growing firms. For example, the layoff proc-
ess in closing firms may have started during or before the base year, leaving a selected 
group of employees in terms of unobserved disability risk. (Recall, however, that we 
failed to uncover initial differences in sickness absence rates between employees in clos-
ing and non-closing firms in Section 3.1.) Moreover, there is the concern of reverse cau-
sality: If many workers in a small firm become disabled, this may have detrimental effect 
on the firm’s economic performance, and can – at least for small firms – even cause 
bankruptcy.   
  Tables 7 and 8 report the estimated average marginal effects of our employment 
opportunity variables from a number of robustness exercises. In column I, we first exam-
ine whether effect estimates for the workplace restructuring variables are impacted by 
inclusion of the firm profitability and local labor market tightness measures in the em-
pirical model. Because the change in profitability is not observed for firms that close   29
down, and because the labor market tightness measures rely on certain exclusion restric-
tions, their presence might affect other coefficient estimates. Results in column I show 
that this is not the case—if anything, dropping these measures raise impact estimates 
slightly for the set of restructuring variables. Column II lists the estimated effects based 
on employees in the restricted sample of firms that did not downsize at all during the two 
years prior to the outcome period. If our results were driven by early sorting caused by an 
ongoing downsizing process, we would expect estimates to be sensitive to this sample 
condition. Column III presents estimates for employees in large firms only (more than 50 
employees). If our results reflect reverse causality, the estimated impacts should drop 
significantly when we restrict the sample to employees in large firms. Columns IV-VI 
report estimates based on reduced samples with additional restrictions regarding recent 
social insurance history and stability of employment in the same firm. Again, if some ad-
verse sorting process had taken place in downsizing/closing firms prior to our sample pe-
riod, we would expect the estimated impacts to decline in these restricted samples.  
Focusing on the estimated impacts of closure with bankruptcy on the disability 
and non-employment propensities, we note that our baseline results appear fairly stable 
across specifications. For women, all of the robustness specifications actually produce 
larger estimated impacts on permanent disability than what we found in the baseline 
model. For men, some of the robustness exercises yield stronger effects. Of particular in-
terest is that the estimates listed in columns V-VI, where we restrict the sample to high- 
seniority workers, exceed those from the baseline model, regardless of outcome measure 
and gender. With our ability to pinpoint the reason for firm closures, we have opted to   30
Table 7. 
Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on temporary or permanent disability and non-
participation. Men, full-time 























in the same 








A) Temporary or permanent disability 
10-20  %  downsizing    0.56 0.57 0.63 0.21 0.54 0.67 
20-35  %  downsizing  1.15 1.09 0.94 0.62 1.03 1.08 
35-99%  downsizing    1.85 1.68 1.45 1.34 1.70 2.17 
Closure  w  bankruptcy  4.99 4.57 4.05 4.53 6.15 6.87 
Liquidation  0.89 0.57 -0.03 0.85 1.66 2.12 
Takeover  0.04 -0.01 -0.23 0.06 0.12 0.17 
        
Return on capital     -0.16  -0.10  -0.08  -0.22  -0.20 
Chang  in  ret  capital    -0.25 -0.11 -0.16 -0.27 -0.12 
Risk  of  unempl  index    1.59 2.19 1.39 1.81 1.51 
Prob  of  reempl  index   -0.81 -0.32 -0.62 -0.70 -0.87 
Percent  w  outcome=1  12.22 12.18 12.49  8.44  12.65 12.87 
 
B) Out of labor force 
10-20  %  downsizing    1.65 1.28 1.70 1.28 1.42 1.50 
20-35  %  downsizing  1.90 1.73 1.44 1.43 1.80 1.79 
35-99%  downsizing    3.34 2.84 2.35 2.38 3.11 3.43 
Closure  w  bankruptcy  8.00 7.02 7.08 6.44 8.60 9.40 
Liquidation  3.52 2.96 1.77 2.64 4.16 5.38 
Takeover  0.42 0.43 -0.02 0.48 0.49 0.54 
        
Return on capital     -0.45  -1.11  -0.61  -0.79  -0.94 
Chang  in  ret  capital    -0.33 -0.66 -0.41 -0.51 -0.53 
Risk of unempl index    0.10  -0.44  -0.06  -0.46  -0.90 
Prob  of  reempl  index   -1.62 -1.76 -1.39 -1.35 -1.64 
Percent  w  outcome=1  10.10 9.98 10.71 7.63  9.83 10.15 
 
C) Permanent disability 
10-20  %  downsizing    0.40 0.40 0.42 0.16 0.45 0.55 
20-35  %  downsizing  0.50 0.46 0.43 0.25 0.57 0.68 
35-99%  downsizing    0.96 0.82 0.95 0.69 1.22 1.67 
Closure  w  bankruptcy  2.20 1.83 2.47 1.81 2.96 3.71 
Liquidation  0.73 0.58 0.21 0.51 1.10 1.36 
Takeover  0.07 0.03 -0.16 0.08 0.11 0.18 
        
Return on capital     -0.10  -0.15  -0.08  -0.12  -0.09 
Chang  in  ret  capital    -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 
Risk  of  unempl  index    0.42 0.66 0.31 0.51 0.64 
Prob of reempl index    0.05  0.20  -0.04  0.11  0.20 
Percent  w  outcome=1  2.96 2.90 3.22 2.03 3.54 4.23 
Observations  524,270 489,368 232,684 388,592 349,757 208,311 
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Table 8. 
Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on temporary or permanent disability and non-
participation. Women, full-time 
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A) Temporary or permanent disability 
10-20  %  downsizing    1.26 1.30 0.87 0.41 1.06 1.19 
20-35  %  downsizing  1.25 1.25 -0.27 0.79 1.25 1.29 
35-99% downsizing   1.02  0.71  -0.34  0.56  0.66  1.21 
Closure  w  bankruptcy  5.15 4.19 2.44 4.91 4.91 6.43 
Liquidation  1.89 1.60 -0.10 1.45 1.54 1.63 
Takeover  1.41 1.50 1.89 1.32 1.66 1.82 
        
Return on capital     -0.63  -0.81  -0.44  -0.68  -0.86 
Chang  in  ret  capital    -0.29 -0.50 -0.39 -0.52 -0.40 
Risk  of  unempl  index    1.82 1.96 1.56 1.29 1.08 
Prob  of  reempl  index   -0.39 -0.34 -0.65 -0.51 -0.82 
Percent  w  outcome=1  18.81 18.74 19.81  13.4  19.00 18.97 
 
B) Out of labor force 
10-20  %  downsizing    1.65 1.49 2.05 1.25 1.58 1.79 
20-35  %  downsizing  2.26 2.22 1.67 1.93 1.93 1.53 
35-99%  downsizing    4.29 3.75 3.61 3.42 3.92 4.61 
Closure w bankruptcy  10.50  9.45  8.94  8.85  13.27  14.45 
Liquidation  4.89 4.45 3.12 4.34 5.22 5.88 
Takeover  0.93 1.02 0.87 0.93 1.38 1.35 
        
Return on capital     -0.43  -0.90  -0.32  -0.65  -0.79 
Chang  in  ret  capital    -0.34 -0.53 -0.48 -0.62 -0.61 
Risk  of  unempl  index   -0.16 -0.74 -0.24 -0.69 -1.12 
Prob  of  reempl  index   -2.46 -2.83 -1.97 -1.73 -1.94 
Percent  w  outcome=1  16.23 16.11 16.06 12.57 15.11 15.04 
 
C) Permanent disability 
10-20 % downsizing   0.21  0.18  0.46  -0.04  0.10  -0.05 
20-35  %  downsizing  0.45 0.40 0.20 0.28 0.56 0.65 
35-99%  downsizing    0.79 0.62 0.65 0.63 1.09 1.38 
Closure  w  bankruptcy  1.44 1.36 1.87 1.66 2.37 3.44 
Liquidation  0.88 0.76 0.04 0.61 1.14 0.96 
Takeover  0.26 0.31 0.36 0.20 0.35 0.41 
        
Return on capital     -0.10  -0.23  -0.08  -0.19  -0.34 
Chang  in  ret  capital    -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 
Risk  of  unempl  index    0.29 0.16 0.13 0.24 0.50 
Prob  of  reempl  index   -0.26 -0.29 -0.14 -0.23 -0.25 
Percent  w  outcome=1  3.77 3.71 3.94 2.59 4.86 6.17 
Observations  174,194  162,547 73,063 119,858  108,315 61,320 
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define our samples broadly and include workers with short tenure in the baseline sample. 
In the empirical literature, however, the common practice is to focus on high-seniority 
workers, typically for reasons of eliminating voluntary quits and firings for cause from 
the treatment group.
14  In our application, limiting the sample to those with high firm at-
tachment will entail looking at an older group of workers and also reducing contamina-
tion in the reference group. As evidence of the former, we note that the average age of the 
samples underlying column VI is 44.2 for men and 44.8 for women (compared to 39.4 
and 38.7 in the baseline, as Table 2 showed). Moreover, in the high-seniority sample the 
four-year unemployment incidence rate in the reference group is reduced by almost one 
half when compared to the baseline, a strong indication of less contamination, while for 
workers in the treatment group unemployment incidence rates are similar regardless of 
sample restriction.
15 Both of these factors will produce larger effect estimates. Impor-
tantly, the finding that contamination bias declines with seniority provides further justifi-
cation for the sample condition of focusing on high-seniority workers used in many stud-
ies of worker displacement, beyond the concerns about heterogeneous effects and intent 
to treat cited in those studies. 
Adjusting for contamination bias in the same way as we did for the baseline mod-
el, we find that among males with at least two years of seniority displacement raises the 
risk of permanent disability by 3.6 percentage points (138 percent). With the five-year 
                                                 
14 A number of studies adopt the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of displacement and 
limit samples to workers with at least three years of seniority (Fallick, 1996). See also the discussions of 
high vs. low tenure workers and the implications for measurement of displacement effects in Jacobson et 
al. (1993) and von Wachter et al. (2009). 
15 Four-year unemployment incidence rates in the reference group underlying column VI are 7.4 
percent for men and 7.7 percent for women, compared to 12.4 and 13.1 percent in the baseline (see Table 
3). In the treatment group (i.e., the bankruptcy bracket), unemployment incidence rates are 56.0 percent for 
men and 65.5 percent for women in the high-seniority sample, compared to 56.5 and 62.2 percent in the 
baseline sample.   33
seniority restriction, the risk is estimated to go up by 4.3 percentage points (132 percent). 
For females, the corresponding effects are 2.8 percentage points (68 percent) when we 
impose the two-year seniority restriction and 3.9 percentage points (73 percent) with the 
five-year restriction. For men, the fraction of new disability claims accounted for by dis-
placement declines somewhat with tenure (from 28 percent for all workers to 23 percent 
for workers with at least five years of seniority), while for women the fraction remains 
stable at around 13 percent regardless of sample restriction on seniority. In conclusion, 
although point estimates vary somewhat across the different sample specifications for 
some of the outcome measures and for some of the downsizing indicators, their overall 
stability – particularly in relative terms – shows that the key findings reported in this pa-
per are highly robust with respect to alternative sampling schemes. 
3.4  Effects on mortality and family dissolution 
Our finding that employment opportunities have a strong impact on subsequent disability 
benefit claims does not necessarily imply that the disability status results directly from 
unemployment. Previous evidence from Norway suggests that job loss adversely affects 
employees’ physical and mental health conditions (Rege et al., 2009) and also potentially 
triggers other traumatic events, such as family dissolution (Rege et al., 2007).  
  To check for possible health effects of job loss, we extend our samples and in-
clude workers who otherwise satisfy initial sample criteria, but who died during the six-
year outcome period. We next estimate the impacts of employment opportunities on mor-
tality in exactly the same manner as we have estimated the impacts on other outcome 
measures. The results are reported in Table 9. Displacement appears to raise mortality for 
men. Adjusting the estimated bankruptcy effect for contamination bias caused by inclu-   34
Table 9.  
Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on mortality six years after base year. 
 Men  Women 
  AME RSE AME RSE 
No  downsizing  (<10%) Ref.  Ref.  
10-20 % downsizing   0.11  0.05  0.13  0.07 
20-35  %  downsizing  0.09 0.06 0.09 0.07 
35-99% downsizing   0.09  0.05  0.06  0.06 
Closure with bankruptcy  0.26  0.10  0.06  0.15 
Liquidation 0.08  0.08  -0.10  0.08 
Takeover  0.10 0.05 0.01 0.06 
      
Initial rate of return on capital
#  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
Change in return on capital
#  -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 
      
Risk of unemployment
# 0.13  0.07  -0.06  0.08 
Probability of reemployment
# 0.02  0.05  -0.04  0.07 
      
Percent with outcome=1  1.09  0.58 
Observations 527,684  174,781 
#Marginal effects are calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. 
See also notes to Table 5. 
 
sion of displaced employees in the control group (non-downsizing firms), we find that 
displacement raises the six-year mortality rate for men by 0.33 percentage points (34 per-
cent). This implies that around 10 percent of the deaths among male workers in our data 
can be attributed to job displacement. A general deterioration of local industry-specific 
risk of unemployment also tends to raise mortality among men. For women, we uncover 
no statistical evidence that displacement or unemployment risk raises mortality, although 
coefficient estimates of the downsizing variables (without closure) are similar in size to 
those for men. The latter is consistent with a large literature indicating that the uncer-
tainty associated with organizational change adversely affects the health of retained em-
ployees; see, e.g., Ferrie (2001) and Røed and Fevang (2007), the latter for recent Nor-
wegian evidence.  
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Table 10. 
Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on divorce four years after base year. 
 Men  Women 
  AME RSE AME RSE 
No  downsizing  (<10%) Ref.  Ref.  
10-20 % downsizing   -0.04  0.16  -0.11  0.31 
20-35 % downsizing  0.33  0.18  -0.17  0.31 
35-99% downsizing   0.49  0.15  0.81  0.28 
Closure with bankruptcy  1.13  0.34  0.18  0.69 
Liquidation  0.42 0.22 0.13 0.37 
Takeover  -0.22 0.15 -0.25 0.28 
      
Initial rate of return on capital
#  -0.16 0.05 -0.04 0.10 
Change in return on capital
#  -0.17 0.05 -0.17 0.10 
      
Risk of unemployment
#  -0.08 0.22 -0.77 0.38 
Probability of reemployment
#  -0.20 0.25 -1.14 0.48 
      
Percent with outcome=1  5.56  6.62 
Observations 277,292  82,278 
#Marginal effects are calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. 
See also notes to Table 5. 
 
  As a final investigation of the diverse consequences of job loss, we next consider 
family dissolution as an endogenous outcome. The results from the exercise where di-
vorce is the dependent variable, and where the sample is restricted to those married at the 
end of the base year, are presented in Table 10. Adjusted for contamination bias, the re-
sults suggest that displacement raises the divorce risk for men by 1.45 percentage points 
(28 percent), and that displacements account for roughly eight percent the family dissolu-
tions among male workers in our data. There are no effects for women. Again, these find-
ings may indicate an additional channel for causality from displacement to disability, at 
least for men, since it is probable that family dissolution will affect the risk of disability. 
Indeed, if we include an indicator variable for divorce during the (four-year) period in the 
baseline model outlined in Section 3.2, we find that family dissolution has a significant 
and positive effect on the disability propensity among men (but not among women); and   36
that divorce raises the permanent disability probability of men by 0.5 percentage point 
(20 percent). 
3.5  Relation to previous evidence 
The effect of downsizing on disability pension utilization in Norway has previously been 
investigated by Rege et al. (2009). Based on a similar empirical approach to the one used 
here, they find that workers originally employed in plants that downsized by more than 
60 percent between 1995 and 2000, were 24 percent more likely to utilize disability pen-
sions in 2001 than comparable workers in non-downsizing plants. In the published article, 
the authors do not distinguish between large downsizings and complete closures. But they 
employ the distinction in a working-paper version of their study (Rege et al., 2005), re-
porting that workers originally employed in closing plants were less likely to enter dis-
ability than workers employed in downsizing plants. Our own findings suggest otherwise, 
and further imply that the adverse effects of displacement in truth are much larger than 
indicated by the results in Rege et al. (2005). We suspect that the discrepancy between 
empirical findings results from differences in the way closures are identified. As stated 
above, without direct information on the reason for closure it is likely that many of the 
presumed closures in employer-employee data actually are reorganizations, e.g., in the 
form of demergers and takeovers. In our data, as many as 60 percent of the jobs in clos-
ing firms turn out to be acquisitions by other companies; see Table 2. This problem 
clearly also imposes measurement error in the downsizing indicators (for example related 
to outsourcing), although to a lesser extent. Although the Rege et al. studies take steps to 
eliminate false downsizings from their data (for example, by recoding cases where large 
groups of workers move together to a new company), some misclassifications are likely   37
to remain. First, there will inevitably be some “false” mass layoffs generated by organiza-
tional change that splits employees into multiple companies. Second, there will be some 
genuine mass layoffs that erroneously are classified as “false” because the displaced em-
ployees succeed in establishing a new company in response to their displacement. To ex-
amine the empirical relevance of such measurement error, we have replicated the down-
sizing indicators used by Rege et al. (2009), as described in their footnote 25 (page 767). 
Using the alternative measure, our estimated effect of a large downsizing event on dis-
ability enrollment (estimated jointly for men and women) becomes virtually identical to 
the estimate of Rege et al. (2009): They report an estimated odds-ratio associated with 
60-100 percent downsizing of 1.30; our own corresponding estimate is 1.31. We have 
also partly replicated the downsizing indicators used by Rege et al. (2005), where closure 
is defined as a distinct event.
16 Consistent with their results, we find that both downsiz-
ings and closures raise the permanent disability propensity by around 25-30 percent, and 
that a closure does not entail a larger effect than a moderate downsizing.  
In their study of short and long-term consequences of displacement, Huttunen et 
al.  (2010) also examine the impact of displacement on subsequent non-participation 
among male workers, reporting that the probability of being outside the labor force is 3.4 
percentage points higher seven years after displacement than for otherwise similar, but 
non-displaced, workers. The study defines displaced individuals as workers who separate 
from plants that close down or reduce employment by 30 percent or more. Even though 
they restrict the sample to high-attachment workers, this strategy entails two potential 
                                                 
16 In this exercise, closure is defined as a downsizing between 95 and 100 percent. Even though 
we replicate their grouping of downsizing/closure events, we have not attempted to define these events 
exactly the same way. While Rege et al. (2005) define downsizing/closure as annual events, both Rege et 
al. (2009) and we define the variables in terms of change in firm size over a four-year period.   38
sources of bias. Again, register-based downsizing indicators will invariably capture some 
false downsizings, related to outsourcing, demergers, and other forms of organizational 
change. Second, some separations are voluntary, even when they occur in downsizing 
firms. In fact, Huttunen et al. (2010) point out themselves that their strategy for identify-
ing displacement will involve some misclassifications and that the estimated effects may 
be imparted by downward bias. Our results, showing much larger effects of displacement 
on labor market withdrawal, suggest that this indeed is the case. 
Rege et al. (2009) also investigate the impact of downsizing on mortality, and re-
port that workers older than 40 who were originally employed in plants that downsized 
by more than 60 percent during 1995–2000 were 14 percent more likely to have died by 
2001 than comparable workers in non-downsized plants. Our results indicate that the true 
impact of displacement may be substantially higher, although large standard errors pre-
vent us from drawing firm conclusions in this regard.
17 Finally, Rege et al. (2007) exam-
ine the impact of plant closure on family dissolution, and find that marriages of husbands 
originally employed in plants that closed down between 1995 and 2000 were 11 percent 
more likely to be dissolved by 2003 than comparable marriages of husbands in stable 
plants. Once again, our results suggest that the true effect is larger. 
We infer from these exercises that downsizing and closure indicators computed 
solely from employment registers, and using conventional approaches for eliminating 
noisy observations, contain substantial measurement error that renders biased estimators. 
                                                 
17 The causal link between displacement and mortality risk has also been studied in other coun-
tries. For example, Eliason and Storrie (2009b) and Sullivan and von Wacther (2009) report mortality ef-
fects among displaced male workers in Sweden and Pennsylvania, respectively, that are even larger than 
those of the present study. Martikainen et al. (2007) uncover an association between unemployment and 
mortality risk in Finland, but argue that there is no excess mortality among displaced workers.   39
In the present paper, we exploit information on recorded bankruptcies to construct a more 
reliable indicator for exogenous displacement. With this indicator, we find that the ad-
verse impacts of displacement – in terms of higher subsequent disability and non-
participation risks – are much larger than what has been previously recognized in the lit-
erature. 
4.  Concluding remarks 
We have shown in this paper that negative shifts in employment opportunities explain 
significant shares of non-participation and disability insurance dependency in Norway. 
The causal relationship between employment opportunities and disability is particularly 
strong for male workers.  
Our findings suggest that the process of reallocating redundant workers from old 
to new employers is far from seamless, and that many displaced workers permanently 
change status from supporting the welfare state to becoming supported by it. Significant 
human capital resources are squandered in this process. 
Even though our empirical analysis also indicates that job displacement have ad-
verse health effects, the strong causal link between employment opportunity and disabil-
ity enrollment leads us to conclude that there is a considerable grey area between unem-
ployment and disability and that a substantial share of the Norwegian disability problem 
really is an unemployment problem in disguise. The unemployment and disability insur-
ance programs are in many cases close substitutes.   40
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Appendix 
Detailed logit regression results 
 Men  Women 
Dependent 
variable:  Disability 
(4 yrs) 














Age 20 in base yr  -0.763  -0.606  -3.640  -0.287  0.609  -3.047 
  (0.075) (0.156) (0.346) (0.090) (0.092) (0.445) 
Age  21  -0.390 -0.377 -3.198 -0.007 0.728 -3.932 
  (0.071) (0.157) (0.333) (0.087) (0.091) (0.729) 
Age  22  -0.317 -0.449 -2.630 0.163  0.697 -2.308 
  (0.071) (0.155) (0.276) (0.086) (0.092) (0.373) 
Age  23  -0.194 -0.438 -2.386 0.223  0.574 -2.203 
  (0.068) (0.151) (0.260) (0.083) (0.091) (0.358) 
Age  24  -0.198 -0.456 -2.581 0.192  0.482 -2.473 
  (0.067) (0.143) (0.274) (0.081) (0.090) (0.387) 
Age  25  -0.176 -0.414 -2.272 0.153  0.409 -1.974 
  (0.064) (0.136) (0.245) (0.078) (0.086) (0.312) 
Age  26  -0.209 -0.492 -2.532 0.199  0.364 -2.155 
  (0.061) (0.130) (0.265) (0.073) (0.082) (0.324)   43
Age  27  -0.142 -0.424 -1.758 0.179  0.361 -1.487 
  (0.058) (0.125) (0.202) (0.070) (0.079) (0.251) 
Age  28  -0.151 -0.454 -1.616 0.276  0.366 -1.525 
  (0.055) (0.116) (0.187) (0.067) (0.075) (0.254) 
Age  29  -0.119 -0.367 -1.342 0.258  0.420 -1.169 
  (0.052) (0.107) (0.175) (0.064) (0.073) (0.222) 
Age  30  -0.181 -0.402 -1.327 0.230  0.330 -1.302 
  (0.051) (0.097) (0.174) (0.062) (0.071) (0.227) 
Age  31  -0.105 -0.334 -1.206 0.254  0.295 -1.073 
  (0.048) (0.093) (0.168) (0.060) (0.069) (0.215) 
Age  32  -0.160 -0.312 -0.966 0.217  0.334 -0.950 
  (0.047) (0.086) (0.161) (0.059) (0.067) (0.203) 
Age  33  -0.129 -0.306 -0.946 0.180  0.235 -0.586 
  (0.045) (0.074) (0.157) (0.058) (0.066) (0.182) 
Age  34  -0.137 -0.248 -0.713 0.164  0.257 -0.445 
  (0.044) (0.066) (0.143) (0.058) (0.067) (0.179) 
Age  35  -0.095 -0.197 -0.576 0.171  0.206 -0.149 
  (0.042) (0.060) (0.139) (0.058) (0.066) (0.165) 
Age  36  -0.083 -0.169 -0.363 0.164  0.187 -0.462 
  (0.042) (0.060) (0.131) (0.057) (0.067) (0.182) 
Age  37  0.020 -0.076 -0.272 0.120 0.169 -0.143 
  (0.041) (0.055) (0.128) (0.058) (0.067) (0.165) 
Age  38  -0.075 -0.062 -0.174 0.144  0.144 -0.150 
  (0.040) (0.051) (0.126) (0.058) (0.068) (0.166) 
Age  39  0.014 0.027 -0.162 0.101 0.069 -0.043 
  (0.038) (0.048) (0.121) (0.057) (0.068) (0.163) 
Age  40  (ref)        
        
Age  41  0.041 0.061 0.232 0.095 0.092 0.265 
  (0.039) (0.049) (0.111) (0.059) (0.070) (0.149) 
Age  42  0.066 0.124 0.219 0.119 0.135 0.338 
  (0.039) (0.053) (0.111) (0.059) (0.070) (0.148) 
Age  43  0.075 0.188 0.374 0.177 0.112 0.477 
  (0.041) (0.055) (0.109) (0.058) (0.070) (0.144) 
Age  44  0.098 0.201 0.390 0.140 0.040 0.461 
  (0.042) (0.057) (0.115) (0.059) (0.070) (0.144) 
Age  45  0.076 0.202 0.525 0.293 0.257 0.698 
  (0.043) (0.061) (0.110) (0.059) (0.069) (0.138) 
Age  46  0.170 0.295 0.688 0.278 0.204 0.669 
  (0.044) (0.065) (0.109) (0.061) (0.071) (0.140) 
Age  47  0.188 0.330 0.887 0.337 0.239 0.928 
  (0.045) (0.064) (0.107) (0.061) (0.072) (0.137) 
Age  48  0.235 0.356 1.011 0.380 0.204 0.862 
  (0.046) (0.063) (0.106) (0.063) (0.073) (0.140) 
Age  49  0.257 0.467 1.186 0.446 0.405 1.047 
  (0.046) (0.066) (0.106) (0.062) (0.073) (0.138) 
Age  50  0.270 0.436 1.176 0.456 0.364 1.060 
  (0.048) (0.068) (0.106) (0.064) (0.075) (0.138) 
Age  51  0.353 0.487 1.392 0.443 0.370 1.257 
  (0.048) (0.067) (0.106) (0.067) (0.076) (0.138) 
Age  52  0.407 0.559 1.553 0.479 0.458 1.412 
  (0.049) (0.066) (0.107) (0.067) (0.076) (0.140) 
Age  53  0.463 0.617 1.793 0.489 0.409 1.543 
  (0.051) (0.069) (0.108) (0.070) (0.079) (0.143) 
Age  54  0.479 0.649 1.967 0.478 0.377 1.514 
  (0.054) (0.071) (0.110) (0.073) (0.082) (0.144)   44
Age  55  0.579 0.758 2.167 0.599 0.628 1.737 
  (0.053) (0.069) (0.109) (0.072) (0.081) (0.144) 
Age  56  0.633 0.844 2.299 0.678 0.664 2.003 
  (0.055) (0.071) (0.111) (0.076) (0.085) (0.145) 
Age  57  0.767 0.974 2.570 0.617 0.590 2.073 
  (0.059) (0.074) (0.115) (0.083) (0.090) (0.152) 
Age  58  0.793 1.148 2.658 0.747 0.704 2.184 
  (0.064) (0.079) (0.121) (0.089) (0.098) (0.163) 
Age  59  1.103 0.936 3.185 0.921 0.508 2.422 
  (0.072) (0.092) (0.127) (0.100) (0.111) (0.175) 
Age  60  1.048 1.556 3.120 0.900 0.968 2.312 
  (0.088) (0.104) (0.148) (0.121) (0.125) (0.204) 
Age  61  1.037 1.728 3.182 0.956 1.133 2.354 
  (0.102) (0.119) (0.169) (0.141) (0.146) (0.235) 
Age  62  0.933 2.108 3.058 0.879 1.457 2.314 
  (0.111) (0.126) (0.181) (0.150) (0.156) (0.249) 
Age  63  1.039 2.217 2.952 1.047 1.531 2.249 
  (0.116) (0.132) (0.191) (0.155) (0.162) (0.265) 
Single  (ref)        
        
Married  -0.047 -0.273 -0.101 -0.037 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.031) (0.022) (0.024) (0.053) 
Divorced  0.257 0.108 0.118 0.295 0.174 0.186 
  (0.020) (0.023) (0.038) (0.025) (0.029) (0.057) 
Widow(er)  0.019 -0.110 -0.097 0.133 -0.034 0.051 
  (0.057) (0.061) (0.080) (0.053) (0.058) (0.084) 
Spouse  -0.013 0.184 -0.033 0.010 0.066 -0.215 
    home  maker  (0.030) (0.033) (0.039) (0.087) (0.099) (0.129) 
Spouse  home*  -0.072 -0.110 0.012 -0.141 0.325 -0.079 
    1-2  children  (0.041) (0.047) (0.081) (0.152) (0.141) (0.388) 
Spouse  home*  -0.104 -0.179 0.163 0.263 -0.066 1.076 
    3+  children  (0.050) (0.058) (0.122) (0.280) (0.316) (0.560) 
No  children  (ref)        
        
1-2  children  0.073 -0.033 -0.239 0.180 0.147 -0.301 
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021) (0.046) 
3+  children  0.147 0.062 -0.353 0.256 0.233 -0.312 
  (0.022) (0.027) (0.061) (0.037) (0.040) (0.111) 
Low  educ*  -0.031 -0.155 0.134 -0.015 0.019 0.012 
    primary  industry  (0.081) (0.081) (0.109) (0.127) (0.126) (0.178) 
Low  educ*        
  manufact  (ref)             
Low  educ*  -0.152 -0.255 0.044 -0.050 -0.305 -0.006 
    retail  (0.039) (0.047) (0.065) (0.046) (0.051) (0.083) 
Low  educ*  -0.165 -0.122 -0.100 0.052 -0.169 0.114 
    hotel,  rest  (0.040) (0.045) (0.083) (0.036) (0.041) (0.064) 
Low  educ*  0.184 -0.017 0.239 -0.052 -0.279 -0.117 
    transport  (0.042) (0.056) (0.070) (0.065) (0.070) (0.107) 
Low  educ*  -0.177 -0.088 0.035 -0.113 -0.262 -0.170 
    finance  (0.041) (0.057) (0.071) (0.042) (0.047) (0.076) 
Low  educ*  -0.280 -0.122 -0.150 -0.228 -0.225 -0.269 
    education  (0.209) (0.221) (0.313) (0.153) (0.168) (0.273) 
Low  educ*  0.472 0.028 0.714 0.315 -0.229 0.301 
    health  service  (0.073) (0.083) (0.109) (0.065) (0.073) (0.120) 
Low  educ*  -0.054 -0.179 0.158 0.120 -0.261 0.059 
    other  industry  (0.061) (0.071) (0.107) (0.060) (0.070) (0.107)   45
Medium  educ*  -0.483 -0.467 -0.893 -0.407 -0.519 -1.985 
    primary  industry  (0.102) (0.113) (0.325) (0.165) (0.159) (1.017) 
Medium  educ*  -0.192 -0.153 -0.202 -0.429 -0.295 -0.485 
    manufacturing  (0.019) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.076) 
Medium  educ*  -0.470 -0.410 -0.289 -0.400 -0.398 -0.340 
    retail  (0.043) (0.053) (0.079) (0.051) (0.055) (0.117) 
Medium  educ*  -0.457 -0.235 -0.575 -0.382 -0.362 -0.628 
    hotel,  rest  (0.048) (0.052) (0.147) (0.043) (0.044) (0.142) 
Medium  educ*  -0.209 -0.284 -0.285 -0.523 -0.637 -0.781 
    transport  (0.049) (0.064) (0.085) (0.067) (0.070) (0.169) 
Medium  educ*  -0.646 -0.359 -0.321 -0.487 -0.514 -0.444 
    finance  (0.044) (0.055) (0.082) (0.044) (0.048) (0.099) 
Medium  educ*  -0.579 -0.246 -0.528 -0.453 -0.150 -0.543 
    education  (0.205) (0.178) (0.437) (0.138) (0.139) (0.429) 
Medium  educ*  -0.075 -0.321 0.213  0.027 -0.308 -0.234 
    health  service  (0.086) (0.100) (0.152) (0.077) (0.088) (0.189) 
Medium  educ*  -0.494 -0.565 -0.567 -0.081 -0.381 -0.520 
    other  industry  (0.072) (0.091) (0.189) (0.069) (0.069) (0.186) 
Bachelor degree  -0.926  -0.721  -0.711 -0.581 -0.677 -0.590 
  (0.036) (0.052) (0.065) (0.043) (0.047) (0.091) 
Graduate school  -1.215  -1.070  -1.120 -0.614 -1.055 -0.916 
  (0.056) (0.073) (0.108) (0.067) (0.079) (0.193) 
Education  0.146 0.119 0.228 0.059 -0.142 0.014 
    missing  (0.052) (0.061) (0.114) (0.082) (0.079) (0.150) 
Experience  1-5  -0.454 0.650 -0.202 0.223 0.478 0.133 
  (0.058) (0.201) (0.111) (0.059) (0.070) (0.129) 
Exper  6-10  -0.180 0.528 -0.256 0.388 0.400 0.036 
  (0.048) (0.160) (0.093) (0.046) (0.052) (0.091) 
Exper  11-15  -0.043 0.428 -0.219 0.334 0.304 0.145 
  (0.040) (0.114) (0.084) (0.035) (0.039) (0.060) 
Exper  16-20  0.011 0.256 -0.157 0.220 0.138 0.056 
  (0.031) (0.069) (0.066) (0.027) (0.030) (0.044) 
Exper  21-25  0.024 0.108 -0.043 0.170 0.072 0.053 
  (0.024) (0.038) (0.051) (0.026) (0.029) (0.040) 
Exper>25(ref)        
        
Log earnings   -0.387  -0.639  -0.676 -0.009 -0.582 -0.359 
    base  yr  (0.022) (0.023) (0.040) (0.027) (0.029) (0.054) 
Diff log earnings   0.041  0.140  0.159  -0.014  0.040  0.079 
  from prior yr  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.034)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.052) 
Immigrant*  0.077 -0.123 -0.030 -0.059 0.057 -0.133 
    OECD  (0.036) (0.065) (0.064) (0.046) (0.051) (0.100) 
Immigrant*  0.565 0.196 0.463 0.263 -0.016 0.475 
    East  Europe  (0.055) (0.092) (0.109) (0.074) (0.083) (0.148) 
Immigrant*  0.891 0.755 1.444 0.751 0.587 0.873 
    M.East/N.Africa  (0.062) (0.083) (0.125) (0.132) (0.134) (0.338) 
Immigrant*  0.319 0.488 0.039 0.509 0.233 0.059 
    Other  Africa  (0.109) (0.125) (0.260) (0.155) (0.168) (0.474) 
Immigrant*  -0.165 0.136 0.344 -0.067 0.003 0.216 
    SE  Asia  (0.075) (0.088) (0.152) (0.071) (0.075) (0.151) 
Immigrant*  0.658 0.500 0.815 0.722 0.460 0.526 
    Other  Asia  (0.065) (0.083) (0.111) (0.107) (0.110) (0.278) 
Immigrant*  0.347 0.134 -0.034 0.437 0.402 0.059 
    South  America  (0.087) (0.121) (0.214) (0.132) (0.137) (0.330) 
County:          
    Oslo  (ref)          46
Østfold  0.336 0.077 0.255 0.269 0.071 0.272 
  (0.029) (0.034) (0.056) (0.040) (0.040) (0.079) 
Akershus  0.069 -0.075 -0.101 0.067 -0.026 0.087 
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.051) (0.029) (0.032) (0.064) 
Hedmark  0.271 0.095 0.217 0.277 0.087 0.412 
  (0.037) (0.041) (0.066) (0.051) (0.054) (0.101) 
Oppland  0.248 0.022 -0.075 0.350 0.147 0.120 
  (0.042) (0.045) (0.081) (0.044) (0.053) (0.094) 
Buskerud  0.217 0.021 -0.149 0.172 0.030 -0.026 
  (0.029) (0.033) (0.058) (0.035) (0.041) (0.076) 
Vestfold  0.144 0.074 0.216 0.141 0.110 0.430 
  (0.034) (0.039) (0.061) (0.043) (0.046) (0.084) 
Telemark  0.287 0.117 0.239 0.252 0.106 0.514 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.075) (0.051) (0.053) (0.090) 
Aust-Agder  0.223 0.109 0.094 0.171 0.026 0.407 
  (0.049) (0.051) (0.079) (0.063) (0.076) (0.129) 
Vest-Agder  0.310 0.195 0.355 0.191 0.146 0.527 
  (0.042) (0.043) (0.071) (0.054) (0.058) (0.103) 
Rogaland  -0.175 -0.052 0.036 -0.231 0.017 0.115 
  (0.034) (0.038) (0.059) (0.042) (0.042) (0.078) 
Hordaland  -0.032 -0.027 -0.248 -0.015 0.052  0.061 
  (0.032) (0.037) (0.057) (0.036) (0.041) (0.074) 
Sogn  og  Fjordane  0.042 -0.039 -0.112 0.010 -0.035 -0.023 
      (0.046) (0.050) (0.084) (0.064) (0.065) (0.133) 
Møre og Romsdal   0.018  -0.070  -0.218  0.095  0.042  0.090 
  (0.038) (0.043) (0.067) (0.047) (0.050) (0.092) 
Sør-Trøndelag  0.180 0.055 0.014 0.226 0.094 0.205 
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.067) (0.041) (0.045) (0.085) 
Nord-Trøndelag 0.008 -0.033 -0.157 0.181 0.092 0.061 
    (0.050) (0.054) (0.085) (0.071) (0.068) (0.136) 
Nordland  0.238 0.212 0.280 0.297 0.179 0.644 
  (0.040) (0.052) (0.073) (0.051) (0.057) (0.097) 
Troms  0.334 0.353 0.333 0.218 0.256 0.598 
  (0.039) (0.055) (0.073) (0.051) (0.059) (0.102) 
Finnmark  0.095 0.442 0.127 0.007 0.225 0.140 
  (0.066) (0.133) (0.149) (0.087) (0.099) (0.181) 
Muni  pop  -0.160 -0.038 -0.122 -0.162 0.063 -0.165 
    <2000  (0.039) (0.047) (0.078) (0.070) (0.067) (0.139) 
Muni  pop  -0.057 -0.042 -0.053 -0.061 -0.025 0.080 
    2-5000  (0.024) (0.028) (0.045) (0.035) (0.037) (0.070) 
Muni  pop  -0.037 -0.016 -0.020 0.020  0.003  0.087 
    5-10,000  (0.021) (0.026) (0.040) (0.030) (0.032) (0.058) 
Muni  pop  0.020 0.014 0.091 0.004 0.011 0.094 
    10-50,000  (0.017) (0.019) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.046) 
Muni  >50,000  (ref)        
        
Firm  size  base  yr -0.039 -0.094 -0.010 -0.223 -0.093 -0.203 
    11-25  (0.026) (0.036) (0.040) (0.030) (0.036) (0.056) 
Firm  size  -0.058 -0.120 -0.013 -0.203 -0.121 -0.102 
    26-50  (0.027) (0.037) (0.041) (0.031) (0.037) (0.057) 
Firm  size  -0.042 -0.087 -0.007 -0.098 -0.073 -0.054 
  51-200  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.039) (0.030) (0.036) (0.053) 
Firm  size        
    >200  (ref)        
No  turnover  -0.167 -0.195 -0.028 -0.169 -0.176 -0.026 
  (0.022) (0.028) (0.041) (0.032) (0.033) (0.060)   47
Turnover 0.1-10%  -0.149  -0.183  -0.009 -0.145 -0.167 -0.004 
  (0.017) (0.022) (0.030) (0.020) (0.023) (0.040) 
Turnover  10-15%  -0.105 -0.164 -0.012 -0.112 -0.115 0.005 
  (0.018) (0.026) (0.034) (0.022) (0.025) (0.044) 
Turnover  15-20%  -0.057 -0.117 0.003 -0.039 -0.070 0.030 
    (0.020) (0.022) (0.035) (0.023) (0.026) (0.046) 
Turnover        
  >20% (ref)             
Early  retirement -0.410 0.643 -0.637 -0.246 0.619 -0.542 
    eligible  (0.036) (0.042) (0.042) (0.057) (0.057) (0.068) 
No  downsizing          
  (<10%)  (ref)             
Downsize  0.049 0.181 0.142 0.078 0.122 0.055 
    10-20%  (0.022) (0.040) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.049) 
Downsize  0.102 0.198 0.171 0.072 0.162 0.118 
    20-35%  (0.019) (0.025) (0.034) (0.024) (0.027) (0.049) 
Downsize  0.163 0.342 0.320 0.049 0.301 0.204 
    35-99.9%  (0.019) (0.029) (0.033) (0.021) (0.024) (0.042) 
Closure  with  0.412 0.712 0.631 0.280 0.658 0.341 
    bankruptcy  (0.041) (0.040) (0.061) (0.047) (0.051) (0.097) 
Liquidation  0.075 0.348 0.241 0.107 0.338 0.226 
  (0.028) (0.033) (0.049) (0.032) (0.037) (0.062) 
Takeover  0.003 0.046 0.023 0.094 0.073 0.076 
  (0.020) (0.032) (0.033) (0.023) (0.026) (0.044) 
Firm  identifier    0.031 0.195 0.171 0.018 0.180 0.114 
    mismatch  I  (0.053) (0.056) (0.090) (0.068) (0.065) (0.129) 
Firm  identifier    -0.030 -0.092 -0.040 0.105  0.065  0.010 
    mismatch  II  (0.053) (0.057) (0.118) (0.069) (0.066) (0.121) 
Return  on  -0.014 -0.078 -0.041 -0.043 -0.039 -0.042 
    capital  (0.008) (0.024) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) 
Change  in  return -0.022 -0.052 -0.026 -0.021 -0.031 -0.030 
    on  capital  (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) 
Risk  of  unempl  0.163 0.000 0.177 0.117 -0.018 0.085 
    index  (0.029) (0.036) (0.049) (0.031) (0.033) (0.061) 
Prob  of  reempl  -0.076 -0.195 0.024 -0.030 -0.181 -0.080 
    index  (0.024) (0.026) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.050) 
Period  2  0.368 0.311 0.064 0.409 0.316 0.049 
  (0.019) (0.036) (0.034) (0.024) (0.026) (0.040) 
Period  3  0.411 0.323 -0.168 0.521 0.416 -0.158 
  (0.023) (0.033) (0.034) (0.024) (0.025) (0.045) 
Constant  -2.199 -2.599 -4.131 -2.126 -2.385 -3.844 
  (0.052) (0.064) (0.113) (0.065) (0.073) (0.143) 
 
Note: Listed parameters are coefficients from the logit regressions underlying results presented in Tables 5 
and 6. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered within firm-by-period cells. Regres-
sions in columns 1-3 have 524,270 observations (34,620 cluster units), and regressions in columns 4-6 have 
174,194 observations (29,700 cluster units). Continuous variables are entered as deviation from their sam-
ple mean. “Experience” measures cumulative years with labor earnings or self-employment income exceed-
ing the base amount of the national insurance system (72,000 NOK in 2009, approximately 11,500 USD). 
Turnover in the base year is defined as max(number of new hires, number of quits) during the year divided 
by the number of employees at the start of the year. “Firm identifier mismatch I” and “mismatch II” denote 
firm identifiers that disappear from the employer-employee data but not from the accounting data and vice 
versa. 